Under the Kyoto Protocol, industrialized countries committed to emission reductions may fufffil part of their obligations by implementing emission reduction projects in developing countries. In doing so, they make use of the so-called Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Two important issues surround the implementation of the CDM. First, if the cheapest abatement measures are implemented for CDM projects, developing countries may be left with only more expensive measures when they have to meet their own commitments in the future (the so-called low-hanging fruits issue). Second, a choice must be made on the type of baseline against which emission reductions are measured: an absolute baseline or a relative (to output) one (the baseline issue). The purpose of this paper is to study the interactions between these two issues from the point of view of the developing country. Two major results are obtained. First, when possible future commitments for developing countries and irreversibility o... 
Introduction
In Kyoto, December 1997, industrialized countries agreed on greenhouse gas emission limitations for the period 2008-2012. The Kyoto Protocol allows for the use of several so-called°exible mechanisms, among which are (i) the trade of emission quotas between industrialized countries (Emissions Trading, Art. 17) and (ii) the possibility for industrialized countries to full¯l part of their obligations by reducing emissions in developing countries (not committed to emission limitations or reductions) via the implementation of speci¯c projects (Clean Development Mechanism, Art. 6). Our focus here is on the second mechanism, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). On the one hand, the CDM should help industrialized countries to reduce their emissions at a lower cost than if they were not allowed to have access to the cheap reductions that can be found in developing countries. On the other hand, the CDM also shares the purpose of helping developing countries hosting emission reduction projects to develop in a sustainable way through the implementation of new and more e±cient technologies.
When deciding on the amount of CDM projects to be implemented, developing countries must be aware that they may be facing own emission reduction commitments in the future. Since most emission abatement measures are irreversible, ignoring possible future commitments could lead to a problem that is very much debated in the forums of the Framework Convention on Climate Change of the United Nations, the so-called`low-hanging fruits' (or cream-skimming) issue: the cheapest abatement measures will be implemented for CDM projects, leaving the developing countries with only more expensive measures when they have to meet their own commitments in the future.
Another issue which is much debated is the choice of the type of baseline against which emission reductions generated via the implementation of a CDM project are evaluated. Baselines may be either absolute or relative. Under absolute baselines, emission reductions are de¯ned as the di®erence between estimated business-as-usual emissions and actual emissions. Under relative baselines, emission reductions are dened as the di®erence between the emissions rate (emissions per unit of output) under an estimated business-as-usual situation and the actual emissions rate, multiplied by 1 the actual level of output. 1 2
The purpose of this paper is to analyze, from the point of view of a developing country, the interactions between the`low-hanging fruits' (LHF) issue and the alternative types of baselines. The (sparse) literature on LHF considers only absolute baselines, while the literature on baseline types is mainly based on static models and therefore ignores the LHF issue. However, as it will be shown in this paper, both issues are related. Let us describe the results of the literature on each of these aspects before explaining the methodology of our analysis.
On the LHF issue, formal analyses are rather scarce. In an optimal control framework analogous to the Hotelling model of exhaustible natural resources, Rose et al. (1999) show the conditions under which the LHF problem may arise. In particular, developing countries would loose their low cost abatement options when cumulative abatement e®ects are present, as well as under market power and some forms of technological change. Akita (2001) {using a particular framework characterized by two types of projects (high-cost and low-cost projects, i.e., high-hanging fruits and low-hanging fruits){ shows that when the implementation of CDM projects leads to future domestic technological improvements, the developing country should, under certain conditions, implement high-cost projects¯rst. If such conditions, bearing on the size of the technological improvement and on the amount of credits generated by the project, are met, then the LHF problem occurs when the low-cost projects are implemented¯rst. Narain and van't Veldt (2001) indicate that the LHF issue is mischaracterized given that developing countries facing emission reduction commitments will also have access to the international permits market and will therefore not necessarily have to implement high-cost measures in the future. In their setting, the LHF problem shows up when project investors have market power as well as when the price of emission credits increases through time and, at the same time, the developing country is not able to auction o® contracts for the future rising returns of the CDM projects. Br ¶ echet et al. (2004) show that developing countries should in general participate to the CDM. They 1 Various methodologies may be used to determine baselines. Fischer (2002) points out three of them: historical emissions, an average emissions standard for the industry and expected emissions. All three can be applied to both absolute and relative baseline types.
2 Note that an important strand of the literature on the CDM (and related mechanisms) addresses the crucial issue of the incentives to overstate emission reductions (see e.g. Millock, 2002, and Fischer, 2002) . Such incentives rest upon the di±culty to observe actual emission reductions. In this paper, we leave this issue aside and assume that the additionality condition of emission reductions is veri¯ed.
2 identify three e®ects that however limit the extent of such a participation: the fact that future allocations of permits to the developing country may vary according to the amount of CDM projects implemented, the change in permits prices through time and the uncertainty on future permits prices.
In fact, Rose et al. (1999) , Narain and van't Veld (2001) and Br ¶ echet et al. (2004) suggest that the LHF issue is no longer a problem if developing countries can be compensated for implementing or accepting the implementation of`too many' CDM projects. 3 The level of this (¯nancial) compensation is a®ected by the magnitude of the various e®ects {as identi¯ed in the di®erent papers{ that are responsible for the LHF problem. While these authors concentrate on absolute baselines, we will analyze how the level of such a compensation must be modi¯ed when relative baselines are used instead of absolute ones. This is of crucial concern since limits to the use of absolute baselines have been set at the seventh conference of the Parties to the On the baseline issue (absolute versus relative), a few more analyses have been done. Janssen (2001) shows that investment projects are less risky under an absolute baseline than under a relative one. However, Laurikka (2002) shows that the relative baseline leads to more conservative emissions predictions while providing more appropriate investment incentives than an absolute baseline. Fischer (2001) points out that a relative baseline leads to a subsidy to production since the amount of emission credits generated are proportional to actual output. In that case, the total amount of reductions may be negatively a®ected because the relative baseline encourages a decrease in the emissions rate, not in the emissions themselves. However, other authors (see for instance Winkler and Thorne, 2002 ) state that such a subsidy e®ect is bene¯cial to sustainable development in some situations, including those where the project leads to the provision of goods (energy for instance) that would otherwise not be provided. Such analyses suggest that absolute baselines favor the environment (emission reductions) while relative baselines favor development (production).
However, these papers are not based on dynamic models including the fact that the developing county may later commit to emission reductions and that abatement measures are usually irreversible. Moreover, their authors use various criteria in order to evaluate the relative performance of the two alternative types of baselines. Our purpose is to focus on the e®ect of the baselines on the situation of the developing country only, instead of deriving general recommendations on which baseline should be used.
In terms of methodology, we integrate both LHF and baseline issues by modelling absolute and relative CDM baselines in a dynamic framework which takes into account developing countries future commitments and the irreversibility of abatement measures.
In order to account for relative baselines, a framework endogenizing production is needed. Moreover, due to the large uncertainties on post-Kyoto commitments, future permits prices are very uncertain. Our approach also takes this feature into account.
In the main part of the paper, we assume that the CDM projects are implemented following an unilateral approach as opposed to bi-or multilateral approach. Under an unilateral approach, the developing country (or an economic agent in this country)
implements the CDM projects and sells itself the emission reduction credits to an Annex-I country (or an economic agent in this country). Under a bi-or multilateral approach, the projects are implemented by the Annex-I country (or a group of Annex-I countries) who bears the costs of such projects while receiving the emission reduction credits. Hence, the developing country keeps passive. We focus on the unilateral approach for two reasons. First, it is more realistic since we believe that, once a world market price emerges for emission permits and credits, developing countries will no longer keep passive. Second, this approach corresponds to the standard assumption in economics when markets are analyzed, that is, the trade surplus is shared among the participating agents. However, we will test the robustness of our results {obtained under the unilateral approach{ under the bi-or multilateral approach.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the dynamic framework and model the behavior of a developing country hosting CDM projects when absolute baselines are used. The case of relative baselines is analyzed and compared to the absolute baselines one in Section 3. The issue of the low-hanging fruits is then discussed in Section 4. In these sections, it is assumed that CDM projects are implemented under an unilateral approach. The bi-or multilateral approach is then analyzed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the results and concludes.
2 Model
We consider two periods indexed by t (t = 1; 2). In the¯rst period, the developing country has no commitment to reduce its emissions but is allowed to implement or host CDM projects. In the second period, the country faces an emissions constraint. Before describing the objective function of the developing country, we de¯ne its production function and describe some preliminary issues. These issues are related to (i) the baseline against which emission reductions via CDM projects are evaluated, (ii) the future commitments of the country {its future permits endowments{, (iii) the uncertainty on future permits prices and (iv) the irreversibility aspect of emission reductions.
Preliminaries
Since we want to model alternative baselines, we need a framework where production is endogenous. We therefore consider a representative industry of the host country whose production technology is described by a Cobb-Douglas function with decreasing returns to scale :
where y t denotes output, e t energy and k t capital at time t, with ® and¯being strictly positive parameters (0 < ®;¯with ® +¯< 1). We assume that the use of a certain amount of energy leads to the same amount of emissions of greenhouse gases.
To reduce its emissions, the industry may reduce its output or increase its energy e±ciency, i.e., increase the capital-energy ratio (k=e). Since this ratio plays a key role in the analysis, we rewrite the production function in the following way
In our framework, CDM projects are considered as abatement measures that increase energy e±ciency. The larger the amount of accepted CDM projects, the larger the energy e±ciency (i.e., the larger the¸t). Moreover, for a given level of output, the cost of increasing energy e±ciency is increasing (marginal costs are increasing).
(i) CDM baseline -In the¯rst period, the emission reductions generated via a CDM project are evaluated against either an absolute baseline or a relative baseline.
Under an absolute baseline, emission reductions are de¯ned as the di®erence between estimated business-as-usual emissions and actual emissions. Formally, the total amount of credits generated are given by e BAU (ii) Permits endowment -In the second period, the developing country commits to emission reductions and receives an amount of emission permits e 2 such that
where e e 2 is an exogenous amount of emission permits and ± is a positive parameter (0 · ± · 1). ± denotes the extent to which emission reductions undertaken in a developing country (via CDM) before its commitment may a®ect its future endowment of permits. Indeed, since post-Kyoto commitments for developing countries are not yet de¯ned, there is a risk that earlier reductions (i.e., Kyoto period reductions) a®ect the reference level of emissions on which negotiations will be based. 4 The lower the ±, the higher the negotiation power of the developing country.
(iii) Uncertainty on permits prices -The emission credits generated via the CDM are fungible with the permits allocated to the countries committed to emission reductions.
Therefore, we denote by ¿ t the price of the permits/credits at period t. Since future permits prices are very uncertain, we assume that the agents only know the density function of the permits price in the second period, f (¿ 2 ), with
(iv) Irreversibility -There is some irreversibility in the decision to reduce emissions because, once implemented, the projects typically last more than one commitment period. Accordingly, if further emission reductions are to be taken subsequently, such reductions will be more costly than the former ones. As suggested by Rose et al. (1999) In order to take the irreversibility aspect into account, we assume that the energy e±ciency indicator (the capital-energy ratio¸t) cannot decrease through time. Once a cleaner technology has been implemented {with the purpose of reducing emissions{, it
is not possible to go back and replace that technology by a dirtier one. Such an indirect interpretation of the irreversibility constraint stands well in line with the concept of clean development'. Formally, the irreversibility constraint reads as follows:
Objective function with an absolute baseline
Let us denote by p e and p k the price of, respectively, energy and capital, expressed in output units. All prices are de°ated by the output price and, for simplicity, are assumed to be constant over time. In this context, the problem of the representative industry {which is assumed to be price-taker{ reads as follows:
subject to (1), (4) and (5) where T 1 is de¯ned just below, ½ (0 · ½ · 1) is the discount factor and
The last term of (7), ¿ 2 [e 2 ¡ e 2 ], is the net sales of emission permits.
T 1 is the sales of CDM credits with
5 As mentionned above, Akita (2003) uses a model with only two types of projects, a low cost and a high cost type projects, but he accounts for possible technological improvements.
7 where e BAU 1 is the value of e 1 solving problem (6) with T 1 = 0 (i.e., in the absence of the CDM). Under this formulation, CDM credits are generated with respect to an absolute baseline. We start the analysis with this standard approach. The case of a relative baseline is analyzed in section 3. Subscripts a and r will denote the value of a variable under, respectively, the absolute and the relative baseline assumptions.
Recalling (2), (3) and (8), we may rewrite problem (6) in the following way:
Note that e BAU 1 and e 2 are not indexed by a since e a2 = e r2 and e BAU a1 = e BAU r1 . This problem is solved by backward induction, starting with the second period.
Behavior in the second period
The solution of problem (10) [
The irreversibility constraint corresponds to
It is more likely to be binding when the price of the energy in the second period, including the permits price, is relatively low. This means that it would be more interesting to substitute energy (and therefore emissions) to capital, which is not possible given the constraint. In that case, the welfare in the second period decreases with respect to an unconstrained situation.
When the irreversibility constraint is not binding, the situation is standard: the levels of emissions and capital are directly determined by their prices, i.e., the price for 8 the use of energy (p e ), the price of an emission permit in the second period (¿ 2 ) and the price of the capital (p k ).
When the irreversibility constraint is binding, the technology is characterized by the same capital-energy ratio as in the¯rst period. Then, the levels of the inputs also depend on the capital-energy ratio of the previous period (¸a 1 ). However, these levels need not be the same as in period 1. They may be both either larger or smaller.
Behavior in the¯rst period
When the irreversibility constraint is not binding, the value of (10), ¦ 2 (¢), does not depend on the¯rst period decisions. Otherwise, ¦ 2 (¢) decreases with the strength of the irreversibility constraint. We now state the existence and the unicity of the solution of problem (9) and we characterize this solution.
Proposition 2.a (i) A solution to problem (9) exists.
(ii) A su±cient condition for the solution to be unique is that (a) either the returns to scale are su±ciently decreasing for given relative permits prices (¿ 1 =p e ) or (b) the relative permits price is su±ciently low for given returns to scale.
(iii) Then, the solution of problem (9), is characterized by
Proof See appendix (Sections 1 and 2.a). ¥
The su±cient condition for unicity (formally established in the Appendix) is in fact satis¯ed for all reasonable values of the parameters. 6 Moreover, it must be emphasized that it is a su±cient condition, not a necessary one.
The shape of the capital-energy ratio,¸a 1 , is illustrated in Figure 1 . The e®ects of the following three components are highlighted: the endowment, the irreversibility constraint and the uncertainty on the future permits price. Let us¯rst assume that, at the same time, emission reductions have no impact on future endowments (± = 0), the irreversibility constraint is not taken into account and there is no uncertainty. Then, the solution is characterized by S0 (S0´¸a
. The optimal value of the capital-energy ratio is linear in the¯rst period permits price.
Let us now introduce successively each of the components described above and analyse how they a®ect the capital/energy ratio. Figure 1 : The capital-energy ratio as a function of the permits price S1 is the locus of solutions when only the endowment e®ect is present (i.e., ± > 0)
. Indeed, in that case the country anticipates the fact that emission reductions in the¯rst period lead to a loss in the second period permits endowments, which are valued at the expected price e ¿ 2 . Therefore, such an e®ect discourages emission reductions (i.e., implementation of CDM projects) in thē rst period. S2 is the locus of solutions for the capital-energy ratio when both the endowment and the irreversibility e®ects are taken into account (i.e., ± > 0 and¸1 ·¸2). In such a situation, the irreversibility constraint is not binding when and only when
Indeed, if the permits price increases from t = 1 to t = 2, the country substitutes capital to energy since their relative prices change. However, if the permits price decreases, a substitution of energy to capital is not feasible due to the irreversibility constraint and the energy e±ciency is too large given the level of the second period permits price. Therefore the irreversibility constraint will be binding in the second period, which is anticipated by the choice of a lower level of the capitalenergy ratio in the¯rst period (S2 is below S1 for all
Finally, S3 is the locus of solutions when there is also uncertainty on future permits prices. In that case, there is a probability that the irreversibility constraint becomes binding if the¯rst period permits price is larger than the lowest possible value of the second period permits price, ¿ 2 min (see the horizontal axis of Figure 1 ). This is taken into account in the¯rst period by the choice of a lower capital-energy ratio w.r.t. the situation without uncertainty: S3 departs from S1 earlier than S2 and, for all ¿ 1 , S3 is below S2.
The above considerations on¸a 1 are only related to the input substitution e®ect due to a change in factor prices. However, the absolute levels of the inputs, and therefore of the production, are also determined by a production contraction e®ect. We have the following proposition:
Proposition 2.b Optimal emissions (e a1 ) are a decreasing function of ¿ 1 whereas optimal production (y a1 ) and capital (k a1 ) are bounded by decreasing functions of ¿ 1 .
Proof See appendix (Section 2.b). ¥ Hence, we are able to prove that, as a trend, y a1 and k a1 decrease with ¿ 1 . Moreover, numerical simulations show that these decision variables are indeed monotonically decreasing in ¿ 1 .
As expected, the increase in the price of an input leads to a decrease of both inputs, and consequently, to a decrease in the output level. This is a rather standard result.
However, we show below that this need not be the case when the CDM baseline is a relative one.
Relative instead of absolute CDM baseline
Under a relative baseline, CDM credits are generated in proportion to output when the emissions-output ratio decreases. Hence,
11 where e BAU 1 and y BAU 1 are the values of, respectively, e 1 and y 1 solving problem (6) with T 1 = 0 (i.e., in the absence of the CDM). 7 Then, under a relative baseline, (9) becomes: max fe 1¸0 ;¸1¸0g
subject to (4)- (5) where
subject to (4)-(5).
The objective is thus similar to the one under absolute baselines. However, as (ii) A su±cient condition for the solution to be unique is that (a) either the returns to scale are su±ciently decreasing for given relative permits prices (¿ 1 =p e ) or (b) the relative permits price is su±ciently low for given returns to scale.
(iii) Then, the solution is characterized by
Proof See appendix (Section 3.a). ¥
The su±cient condition for unicity is the same as the one presented above in proposition 2.a, related to the absolute baseline case.
7 In this respect, we follow the approach of Laurikka (2002) . The following observations can be made. First, when no e®ects are present, it is not surprising to observe the same substitution e®ect under both baselines (i.e.,¸r 1 = a1 , see S0) since relative input prices are exogenous and do not change with the baseline. Second, the endowment e®ect plays in the same way for both baselines (see S1). Third, the other elements (irreversibility and uncertainty) start to have an impact on the solution at the same level of ¿ 1 (at ¿ 2 min + ½±e ¿ 2 precisely). Moreover, when the irreversibility constraint is binding, the irreversibility and uncertainty e®ects are stronger under the absolute baseline than under the relative one (¸a 1 <¸r 1 , see S3a and S3r). Indeed, the gains in the¯rst period, relative to those in the second period, are larger under the relative baseline due to the subsidy e®ect identi¯ed above. Therefore, the cost of being left with too e±cient equipments in the second period (the irreversibility constraint binding) is relatively lower than under the absolute baseline. Accordingly, it is in the interest of the country to go further in the substitution of inputs with respect to the absolute baseline case.
As far as production and emissions are concerned, we state the following result: Proof See appendix (Section 3.c). ¥ We also observe numerically that e r1¸ea1 , which is not surprising since y r1¸ya1 . 8
Hence, the production subsidy always leads to higher levels of output, and therefore of inputs.
The absolute values of the inputs, and therefore of the output, need not be the same, even if the constraint is not binding (¸r 1 =¸a 1 ). Figure 3 illustrates the shape of emissions and production under absolute and relative baselines (see ea, ya and er, yr respectively). 9 Under the absolute baseline, the rise in the permits price leads to the usual inputs substitution and output contraction e®ects (see Proposition 2.b). These e®ects tend to decrease the levels of both emissions and production. Under the relative baseline, the subsidy e®ect plays in the other direction. This e®ect tends to increase production, and therefore emissions. The subsidy is equal to ¿ 1 e BAU 1 y BAU 1 per unit of output (recall (14)) and is thus a linear function of the permits price ¿ 1 . Figure 3 shows that if ¿ 1 is su±ciently high, the subsidy e®ect overcomes the output contraction e®ect due to the increase in the total energy price, so that output increases through the 8 Note that in the case of the absolute baseline, the implementation of CDM projects does not lead to changes in world emissions. However, under relative baselines, world total emissions either decrease (for low values of ¿ 1) or increase (for high values of ¿ 1) throught the implemention of CDM projects. increasing production) at the same time.
The comparison of the pro¯ts under both baselines leads to the following important result:
where ¦ ¤ a1 and ¦ ¤ r1 are the solution of respectively problem (9) and problem (14), if either (a) the returns to scale are su±ciently decreasing for given relative permits prices (¿ 1 =p e ) or (b) the relative permits price is su±ciently low for given returns to scale.
Proof See appendix (Section 3.c). ¥ Proposition 3.c provides a su±cient (but not necessary) condition for this result to hold. This condition is satis¯ed for all reasonable values of the parameters. Surprisingly, pro¯ts are larger under the absolute baseline than under the relative one. One could have indeed expected that the subsidy, by increasing the level of output, also leads to larger pro¯ts. Let us give a tentative description of this result by decomposing the pro¯t under both baselines into four components: (i) the¯rst period current pro¯t without the revenues from CDM credits sales (call it e ¼ i1 ), (ii) the¯rst period revenue from the sales of CDM credits (T i1 ), (iii) the second period current expected pro¯t without the net sales of permits (E (e ¼ i2 )) and (iv) the second period expected revenue (spending) from the net sales (purchases) of permits (E (T i2 )).
From such a decomposition, one can make the following observations. In t = 1, both e ¼ i1 and T i1 are much larger under the absolute baseline. In t = 2, E (T i2 ) is larger under the relative one while E (e ¼ i2 ) have almost the same value under both baselines.
In the¯rst period, for any ¿ 1 , the subsidy e®ect under the relative baseline leads to a level of production that is beyond the one selected under the absolute baseline. The choice is somehow`distorted' by the presence of the subsidy. Hence, the¯rst period current pro¯t e ¼ i1 (which does not take the CDM revenues into account) is necessarily lower under the relative baseline than under the absolute one. Moreover, the CDM revenues are larger under the absolute baseline. In fact, the absolute baseline is more generous than the relative one in period 1.
In the second period, the di®erence between the current pro¯t E (e ¼ i2 ) under both baselines can only come from the irreversibility constraint. Since this constraint is more stringent under the relative baseline (¸a 1 ·¸r 1 ), E (e ¼ i2 ) tends to be larger under the absolute baseline. However, we observe that the constraint plays a minor role in that respect. On the contrary, E (T i2 ) is signi¯cantly larger under the relative baseline. This is only due to the permits endowment e®ect: under the relative baseline, fewer reductions take place in the¯rst period, which tends to attenuate the permits endowment e®ect, that is, to increase the initial allocation of permits w.r.t. the absolute baseline situation.
Thus, as a whole, we observe that the e®ects favoring the absolute baseline dominate those favoring the relative one.
The`low-hanging fruits' issue
Despite the transfers of clean technologies associated with the implementation of CDM projects, developing countries have been somewhat reluctant to participate in the CDM. Such a reluctance is often said to be based on the`low-hanging fruits' (LHF) issue: the cheapest abatement measures will be implemented for CDM projects, leaving the developing countries with only more expensive measures when they have to meet their own emission reduction commitments in the future.
Analyses in the previous sections have implicitly tackled this issue and suggest that the LHF problem is unfounded. First, recall that, in the present context, the implementation of CDM projects corresponds to an increase in the capital-energy ratio (¸).
We have shown that it is always optimal for the developing country to implement CDM projects for every strictly positive permits price (¸i 1 (¿ 1 ) >¸i 1 (0) ; 8¿ 1 > 0; i = a; r).
Hence, developing countries should always participate in the CDM and implement at least some projects.
Second, low cost abatement projects are always implemented¯rst (since the capital energy ratio is increasing with the permits price). Therefore, it would never be optimal for a developing country to keep its low-hanging fruits (low cost projects) for future use and implement its high cost projects¯rst. This suggests that, at least in our context, the terminology`low-hanging' is inappropriate.
Third, the above analyzes have shown that the developing country should accept the implementation of all CDM projects up to a certain threshold determined by the optimal capital-energy ratio¸1 (¿ 1 ). The developing country should not accept the implementation of supplementary projects unless it receives the appropriate¯nancial compensation.
We study now how the extent of this compensation varies with the context under consideration, more particularly the type of baseline and the level of the permits price. Such an analysis leads to the following three observations. 12 (i) For a given ¿ 1 and for a given baseline, the compensation increases with the amount of CDM projects implemented beyond the optimal level. This is fairly intuitive.
(ii) For a given ¿ 1 and for a given ¢¸=¸1 ¡¸i 1 , the compensation is larger under relative baselines than under absolute ones (although the optimal pro¯ts are always larger under the absolute baseline). (iii) For a given baseline and for a given ¢¸, the e®ect of an increase in the permits price (¢¿ 1 ) di®ers according to the baseline used: the compensation decreases signi¯cantly with the permits price under absolute baselines while it does not vary signi¯cantly under relative baselines (same shape of the curves).
Finally, particular attention must be devoted to sensitivity analyses related to the endowment e®ect (±) and the uncertainty on future permits prices. An increase in the ± parameter (measuring the extent to which future allocation of permits are a®ected by current emission reductions) leads to a strong increase in the level of the compensation. An increase in the level of uncertainty on future permits prices also raises the compensation, but by a small amount. These results are observed under both baselines.
positive) values of ¢¸. We limit these variations (¢¸) up to 100% of the corresponding optimal capital-energy ratio. 12 Sensitivity analyses on the parameters have been performed and con¯rm the robustness of our results.
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Multilateral instead of unilateral CDM projects
In sections 2 to 4, the way of modelling the behavior of a representative industry corresponds to what is usually called the unilateral approach as opposed to bi-or multilateral approach (see the discussion in Section 1). One may however wonder if the above results still hold in a multilateral approach. The purpose of this section is to give some insights on it. To simplify the analysis, we shall assume that there is no uncertainty and that future allocations of permits are not a®ected by the amount of emission reductions in the¯rst period (± = 0). 
since it gets only a fraction ' of the CDM revenues. When ' = 1, we are back to the unilateral projects context.
The industry in the developing country will implement CDM projects only if such an implementation leads to higher pro¯ts than without it, that is,
). This will always be the case for
If ¿ 1 · ¿ 2 , the irreversibility constraint is not binding and
with ' i = 0. Therefore, the analysis is the same as under unilateral projects and the developing country implements CDM projects up to¸i 1 =¯[
If ¿ 1 > ¿ 2 , the irreversibility constraint is binding (¸1 <¸i 1 =¸i 2 ) and ¼ 2 ¡¸1¢ > ¼ 2 (¸i 1 ), with ' i > 0. Hence, the share of the CDM revenues that the host country obtains must be su±ciently large in order to induce it to implement some projects. This is a new result compared to the unilateral projects context where the developing country always has incentives to participate in the CDM.
Moreover, when it participates in the CDM (i.e., when ' i · ' < 1 and ¿ 1¸¿ 2 ), the developing country implements fewer projects under a multilateral approach than under an unilateral one. Indeed, as it can be seen from (18), ' < 1 implies that a lower weight is attributed to the¯rst period relative to the second one. Accordingly, pro¯t losses due to the irreversibility constraint (when binding) are relatively more important in such a situation than under unilateral projects, which leads to the choice of a lower level of the energy intensity than when ' = 1.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to analyze the interactions between the`lowhanging fruits' issue and the alternative types of baselines from the point of view of a developing country. This has been done by modelling both absolute and relative baselines while taking into account future emission reduction or limitation commitments and as well as the irreversibility aspect of abatement measures.
In this framework, the relative baseline leads to a larger amount of production than the absolute baseline. Indeed, under a relative baseline emission reduction credits play the role of a subsidy to production. However, we have shown that the developing countries' industries where emission reductions take place always enjoy larger pro¯ts under the absolute baseline. When these pro¯ts can be interpreted as a proxy of the budget devoted to consumption, developing countries governments maximizing its citizens utility of consumption should foster the use of absolute baselines. Such a result is of particular concern since current developments tend to be directed towards the use of relative baselines.
When the developing country implements by itself CDM projects (in an unilateral context, that is the country is not passive and captures its part of the trade surplus),
we have also highlighted the fact that the`low-hanging fruits' problem is unfounded, whatever the type of baseline under consideration: developing countries should always implement at least some CDM projects, and should start by the low cost ones¯rst.
Moreover, the extent of the compensation that such a country should require if too many projects were to be implemented has been analyzed. Such a compensation is larger under a relative baseline than under an absolute one (although absolute baselines lead to larger pro¯ts). It always increases with the number of projects implemented and the extent to which future allocations of permits are a®ected by emission reductions 20 due to the CDM also plays a key role on the size of this compensation. Moving to a situation in which the developing country captures only part of the surplus (i.e., in a bi or multilateral context) does not change fundamentally the results, except that, for large values for the¯rst period permits price (i.e., when the irreversibility constraint is binding), the developing country needs to receive a minimal share of the surplus in order to have incentives to accept some CDM projects.
